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Recent research has dealt with various sources of insecurity (corruption, piracy, terrorism) by modelling the long-term effect insecurity has on trade (Anderson 2008; Anderson and Bandiera 2006; Anderson and Marcouiller 2002, 2005) . Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) have made the point that inadequate institutions constrain trade far more than tariffs do. Empirical analysis in this area has focused on the impact of violent acts such as terrorism, civil wars and external conflicts on trade (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2004; Verdier, 2008 and De Sousa, Mirza and Verdier, 2009) . In this paper, however, we focus on the impact of maritime piracy on trade, which has not yet been studied, at least to our knowledge. The main advantage in doing this is that it allows us to cover a gap in the literature by addressing violent acts in third-party countries' waters, as Mirza and Verdier (2008) suggested.
Piracy increases the cost of international maritime transport since higher premiums must be paid to crews sailing through dangerous waters, and the cost of insuring the goods shipped also increases. Alternatively traders can adopt longer and costlier trade routes or change to alternative means of transport (products with a high value/weight ratio could switch to air-freight). The longer route around the Cap of Good Hope is an option considered by maritime companies, but it was not used before 2008, and only very scarcely since (Bendall, 2010) .
Data scarcity may partly explain why we have been unable to locate any studies estimating the effects of piracy on trade. For the purposes of this paper, however, we have used new data on piracy attacks supplied by the International Piracy Center (IPC) and empirical research that increasingly introduces accurate measures of insecurity into gravity equations (e. g. Marcouiller, 2000; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2004; Mirza and Verdier, 2008; Wilmsmeier and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2010 ).
Our aim is twofold: On the one hand we estimate the impact of maritime piracy on maritime trade between Europe and Asia using data on incidents of piracy between 1999 and 2008. In doing so, we account for omitted variable biases and control appropriately for potential endogeneity between acts of piracy and trade. We also investigate whether there has been any substitution effect between transport modes as a consequence of escalating maritime piracy. On the other hand, we estimate the cost of maritime piracy and compare it to the cost of a full scale conflict (Afghanistan) and to the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea) for the international community in the year
2008.
According to our findings, the effect of ten additional vessels hijacked is associated to an 11% decrease in exports and the international trade-related-cost of piracy is estimated to be around 28 billion dollars. The results indicate that the estimated cost of war almost doubles the cost of low intensity conflict.
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The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we review the related literature on insecurity and international trade; in section 3 we present the data used and some descriptive statistics; in section 4 we outline our model, empirical estimation and our main results; in section 5 we discuss the cost of modern maritime piracy for the international community and in section 6 we present our conclusions and ideas for further research.
INSECURITY AND TRADE
It is a widely accepted assumption that insecurity decreases trade opportunities. As noticed by Anderson (2008) most of us lived in a more or less 'predatory world', which makes it surprising that few papers have tried to determine to which extent trade is lowered by insecurity. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) , Anderson and Bandiera (2006) and Anderson (2008) have modelled theoretically the conditions under which endogenous transactions costs, due to criminal activities like piracy, will destroy trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) show how difficult it is for countries to abandon autarky and open up to trade when no institutions are available to protect transactions. Anderson and Bandiera (2006) developed a simple model for contract enforcement carried out by an exogenous agent, such as the mafia or private police forces. Anderson (2008) applies the same conceptual framework to show how merchants can organize through guilds or granted monopolies to protect their transactions. Marcouiller (2000) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) , have used the gravity model of trade to research empirically the extent to which insecurity deters trade. We have chosen to follow the same strategy in this paper. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) used institutional measures to determine the degree of security enjoyed by a particular country. They differentiate between transparency (measures declared to be taken to fight insecurity) and enforceability (the measures, among the former, which are actually carried out). They found that the more transparency the highest the trade volume. In an unpublished paper based on an earlier version of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) , Marcouiller (2000) investigates whether insecurity problems affect all type of goods in the same fashion. Using Rauch's classification (1999) that splits goods into homogenous, price-referenced goods and differentiated goods, the author finds that insecurity affects trade whatever the type of good. When differentiating between contract insecurity and the prevalence of crime and theft, however, trade in homogeneous goods appears to be more vulnerable to crime and theft, whereas trade in differentiated goods is more sensitive to contract insecurity. Marcouiller (2000) defines piracy and hijacking as stealing merchandise in order to sell it illegally. But this kind of criminal activity, in spite of being frequent in many ports, is only weakly related to the type of piracy we are concerned with in this paper, which mainly involves the hijacking of a ship and its crew. The chief economic motive behind these hijackings is to obtain a substantial ransom for the crew, the ship and its cargo, not to sell the looted goods. The variables used by Marcouiller (2000) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) measure merchandise security at the start and end points of the journey. They do not deal with security failures during the course of the journey, such as those involving acts of piracy. This paper addresses this particular issue by using data on maritime piracy.
Refining the analysis initiated by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) , Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) and Blomberg and Hess (2004) , distinguish several types of violent acts: terrorism, civil wars, external conflicts, riots and uprisings. They find each of these to have a significant negative impact on bilateral trade. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) find bilateral trade to drop by 4% if a country experiences a 100% rise in terrorist activity, while Bloomberg and Hess (2004) find that a single terrorist attack leads to a 7.6% decline in that country's bilateral trade. Both studies conclude that external and internal armed conflicts have a greater impact on trade than terrorism does. Mirza and Verdier (2008) and De Sousa, Mirza and Verdier (2009) focus exclusively on terrorist activities. The first of these studies highlights the specificities of terrorism and their relevance for the strategy used to estimate its effect on bilateral trade. Terrorist acts are directional since they are perpetrated against the interests of a targeted nation by individuals of a perpetrator nation on the soil of the targeted nation, the perpetrator nation, or a third country. Hence terrorist acts have an impact on the bilateral trade relations between the targeted nation and the perpetrator nation, as well as between the neighbouring countries of the perpetrator nation and the targeted nation. Terrorist attacks also have a direct impact on the GDP of the targeted nation, and measures undertaken to fight terrorism impact bilateral trade. Moreover, the incidence of terrorist activity depends on the security measures undertaken to prevent it and on the extent to which modern economies are made vulnerable by their openness. To assess the impact of terrorism on bilateral trade, the global effect of trading with a terrorist country must be differentiated from the effect of bilateral terrorism on trade. Consequently, the endogeneity problems resulting from the effects of terrorism on GDP, and of security measures on terrorism must be taken into account. Mirza and Verdier (2008) single out the case of the impact of terrorism on imports to the United States (US) from countries in which terrorism against the US originates. In order to circumvent the problem created by the impact of security measures on bilateral trade, they use terrorist incidents targeting the US located in a third-party country (neither the US nor the perpetrator's country). They found that a 1% increase in terrorism reduces US imports from the perpetrator's country by around 0.01 %.
Modern maritime piracy differs from terrorism in several respects. Attacks occur on route instead of being directed against a particular country. According to Mejia and al (2009) pirates do not choose their targets according to the origin of the ships. They do, however, try to avoid ships sailing under the flag of a country with a naval force in the area (Kiourktsoglou and Coutroubis, 2010) . Piracy may have a significant impact on GDP of the trading countries through a drop in trade, but its impact through asset destruction or enhanced security measures is minimal. Conversely, the latter do have an impact on the amount and nature of piracy. Table A .1 and Graph A.1 in the Appendix).
We differentiate between three kinds of incident according to the extent to which the ship's journey is disrupted: Attempted acts of piracy, boardings and hijackings. An attempted piracy act occurs when pirates board a ship and abandon it empty-handed after being discovered, or in instances in which a ship is fired upon without being stopped. Instances of boardings entail actual boarding of a ship by pirates and theft (generally the personal belongings of the crew and/or goods carried for crew maintenance and en-route ship repairs). These incidents may involve violence against the crew. The last type of piracy act, hijacking, consists in the seizure of the ship and its crew, the immobilization of the ship in a coastal area under the control of the pirates and a ransom being demanded in exchange for the crew members, the ship and its cargo. It is most obviously hijackings that are the most disruptive for maritime trade. Table 1 shows the quantitative evolution of piracy incidents over time. It is worth noting the sharp increase in hijackings in 2008 in comparison to previous years. 
Variables
In this section we set out the variables used in our empirical work, focusing on our target variable: piracy incidents. Sources and variable definitions are listed in Table A.2. Four of these variables concern piracy incidents: t_tot represents all piracy incidents (attempted boardings and successful ones) on a particular route, t_attempt is for all failed boarding attempts, t_boarded we use for incidents in which a ship has been boarded but not hijacked, and finally t_hijack stands for hijacked ships. We expect the t_tot to correlate negatively with bilateral maritime trade. Moreover, we expect that the more disruptive acts of piracy (hijackings) to have a greater negative impact on bilateral maritime trade.
Our other variables are classical variables for gravity equations: distance (Dist ij ), is expected to be negatively related to bilateral maritime trade, colonial links (Colony ij ) and common official language (Comlang_off) are expected to be positively related to bilateral maritime trade. The GDPs per capita and populations of the importer and exporter (Yh i , Yh j and Pop i , Pop j respectively) are used as control variables as suggested in the gravity model literature. We expected GDPs per capita to be positively related to bilateral maritime trade and populations to be negatively related to maritime trade. A summary of the statistics used is presented in Table 2 . 
Model Specification
The gravity model of trade is currently the most widely accepted framework for modeling bilateral trade flows (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008) . In it, bilateral trade levels are usually related to the nominal incomes and populations of the countries involved, to the distance between economic centres of both, and to a number of trade impediments and facilitation variables. Dummy variables, such as former colonies, common language, or a common border, are generally used as proxies for these factors. The gravity model has been widely used to investigate the role played by specific policy or geographical variables in bilateral trade flows. In this case we use incidents of piracy on a given route to augment the traditional model, adding alternatively number of attempts, boarded ships, hijacks or total number of incidents to the trade hindering variables. Introducing time variation the augmented gravity model is specified as (1), where X ijt are the exports from country i to country j in period t in current US$; YH i (YH j ) indicates the GDP per capita of the exporter (importer), Pop i (Pop j ) expresses exporter (importer) populations, Dist ij is geographical distances between countries i and j, and F ij represents other factors hindering or facilitating trade (e.g., common language, a colonial relationship, or being landlocked). Piracy ijt is the number of piracy incidents on the trade route linking the two countries i and j.
Lags are included in the model along with piracy variables, as incidents of piracy will affect decisions for shipping in the following years. In this manner we hope to avoid inverse causality issues, as incidents of piracy may be expected to be higher in crowded sea lanes, where traffic is dense and the possibilities for attacking vessels are greater.
The model is generally estimated in log-linear form. Using logarithms for Equation 1, the gravity model is specified as follows.
(2), where L expresses variables in natural logs, the other explanatory variables having been described above.
t are specific time effects that control for omitted variables common to all trade flows but which vary over time, they could be a proxy for the business cycle. δ ij are trading-partner fixed effects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors. When these effects are specified as fixed effects, the influence of the variables that are time invariant cannot be directly estimated. This is the case for distance; common language, colonial links and landlocked countries-therefore, its effect is subsumed into the country dummies. Since the variable of interest is piracy incidents, and variability is mainly over time, in some estimations we replace the time dummies by a trend.
Considering that it may take some time before insecurity fully affects trade, we include the second lag for the different types of piracy incidents in our model.
Continuing with our analysis we consider a modification to include the value of air trade as an additional regressor. This second specification which accounts for air trade in a panel data framework is given by
where LXair ij is the value in US$ of air trade between i and j in year t, and ε ijt expresses the error term that is assumed to be well behaved. The other variables are the same as in Equation 2, above.
Finally, we estimate Model 3 for each specific route, to investigate whether the number of incidents has a different impact on each route.
Main results
Models 1 and 2 are estimated for annual exports from 27 European Union (EU) countries to 20 Asian countries and Australia (Table A. 3) for a 12 year period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Table 3 shows the results obtained when equation 2 is estimated for all trade routes with hijacks as the target variable. Preliminary results indicate that the only variable that is statistically significant is the number of hijacks, whereas the number of attempts, number of boarded vessels and total number of incidents are not statistically significant for all specifications. We were not able to control for time effects common to all trade flows in the results for all trade routes (Table 3) because they are collinear with the number of incidents, which main source of variability is over time.
After trying different specifications, it was the second lag of the number of hijacks that was found to be most relevant, further lags not being statistically significant. The model was first estimated using simple OLS for the pooled data (Baseline) and using random (M1) and fixed effects (M2) for each specific trading pair. As possible refinements we also estimated a fixed effect model corrected for autocorrelation (M3), another fixed effect model with standard errors corrected also for spatial cross-correlations (M4) and two dynamic models estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM): one estimated with the variables in levels (M5) and a second model with the variables in first differences (M6). A Hausman test indicates that the country-pair effects are correlated with the error term and therefore only the fixed effects specification is consistent.
In all models, the coefficient estimated for the number of hijacks is negative and statistically significant at standard levels. As expected, an increase in number of attacks hinders exports. Since the results in models 5 and 6 indicate that the coefficient on lagged exports is not statistically significant, our preferred results are those of Model 5, with dyadic fixed effects and controlling for autocorrelation and spatial correlation in the residuals. According to the results obtained in Table 3 , the effect of one additional vessel hijacked is associated with a decrease in exports of about 1.1% (M4). We also tried with export volumes instead of export value, obtaining results similar in magnitude and significance.
Table 3. Baseline results for all trade routes
In Table 4 , we present the results obtained by estimating Equation 3, which includes the value of air freight as additional regressor. The estimated coefficient for lxva is not statistically significant in the models specified with fixed effects, only in the OLS baseline model and in M1, estimated with random effects, is the coefficient negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of our target variable, namely piracy, remains unchanged. Table 5 present the results for each maritime route, we can observe that impact is greatest on the route linking Europe to the Sub-Continent, which only includes vessels hijacked in regions ES, RGSA and ISCS. 
Table 4. Break-down of results by specific Trade route (Equation 3)

DISCUSSION: THE COST OF A FAILED STATE
In this section the estimates obtained in Section 4 are used to simulate the costs of piracy for the international community and to compare the case of Somalia with that of two other countries, Afghanistan and North Korea, which also generate costs, albeit differently, for the international community.
Some authors argue that Somalia could be better off without a centralized government than with its former one (Leeson, 2007; Powell et al, 2008) . In what follows, we try to shed some light on the question of whether the international community could have an interest in maintaining a stateless Somalia. We compare the cost for the international community of Somalia as a failed state with a strategic geographic position, with the cost of an antagonist state (Afghanistan) and the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea). From of our back of the envelope calculation, it is clear that the international community can co-exist with a quasi-autarkic State since no threat by the latter has materialized. The war in Afghanistan is obviously more costly for the International community than the situation in Somalia and North Korea. We had in fact expected a larger difference between the cost of the Afghan war and that brought about by Somali maritime piracy. It would undoubtedly be greater if estimates of the long-term impact of the 9/11 terrorist attack on international trade were included, particularly the effects of tighter security regulations adopted by many countries after 2001. Mirza and Verdier (2008) provided a partial answer to this question for US trade by estimating the impact of terrorist acts. They did this by linking the drop in business visas issued to enter the US and their consequences for US imports. A negative and significant impact is observed five years after the terrorist attack. We tend to think that the negative effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is not limited to trade with the USA, but also extended to many other countries that adopted tighter controls at their borders. It may even be possible that countries that have raised security, trade more between themselves and the new measures of control have only a transitory effect. Furthermore, these additional controls might have led to a reduction in insurance costs for trade between the countries adopting them, but further research is definitely needed to shed more light on these issues.
Conclusions
We have applied a gravity model to annual exports from 27 EU countries to 21
destinations. The effects of piracy incidents were captured by the number of attempts, the number of boarded vessels and the number of hijacked vessels in the three maritime routes considered. Two main conclusions emerged. First, not all acts of violence against ships hinder international maritime trade, only the most harmful (hijackings) of these lower the amount of trade between nations. Second, as most of the incidents of piracy involving hijacking are attributed to Somali pirates, it seems reasonable to say that, were piracy to disappear in the Gulf of Aden (RSGA region), there would be a slight drop in the cost of maritime trade between Asia and Europe. Third, air freight does not appear to be a substitute for maritime trade; this result is preliminary, as estimates for different type of goods need to be calculated.
Interestingly, it appears to be the case, that rather than eradicating piracy, the International Community has decided to contain it. According to the Commander in chief of the joint European Naval Task Force, the naval forces are in a position to deter, rather than fully eradicate, piracy, due to the vast expanse of ocean in which the pirates operate, as it is impossible to intercept systematically all attempts of piracy. An alternative solution would be to send ground forces onto the Somali shore. This option has been ruled out because of the human and economic cost it would entail, as demonstrated 18 years ago with the US lead operation "Restore Hope". Yet another solution would be to revive an active gunboat policy on the Somali ports such as Eyl and Garacad, which are known to be used by pirates. Although this may seem less expensive and more feasible, with modern war faring techniques, it would be to ignore a key fact in the current Somali political situation: pirates are one of the few organized forces capable of opposing the Islamist militia that rules a vast part of the country.
Weakening the pirates and the two proto-states largely living off the spoils of piracy, could lead to a power vacuum in the regions where the Islamist militias are less active.
A strong Islamist State could be a haven for global terrorist activities and, as recent history has shown, the economic costs brought about by large scale attacks on western soil, through the economic disruption and retaliations they induce, could be extremely
costly. Source: Authors' own calculations using data from the IMB Piracy Reporting Center, the International Maritime Bureau, and the ICC Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org Source: Self-created Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. L is for natural logarithms, X and LXair are the value of maritime and air trade; and YHi and YHj are per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of exporter and importer countries respectively; Popi and Popj are country populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK, the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL are dummy variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and when they had a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. is the appropriate variable in year t-2 (second lag) and L. is for year t-1 (first lag). FD indicates that the model has been estimated with the respective variable in first differences. Note: t-statistics were calculated using robust standard errors. L indicates natural logarithms, X and LXair express the value of maritime and air trade; and YHi and YHj are for per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the exporter and importer countries; Popi and Popj express country populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK is the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL are dummy variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and when they had a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. expresses the respective variable in year t-2 (second lag) and L. the variable in year t-1 (first lag). FD means that the model has been estimated with the respective variable in first differences. Note: t-statistics are reported, calculated using robust standard errors. L expresses natural logarithms, X and LXair represents the value of maritime and air trade respectively; and YHi and YHj are for per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the exporter and the importer country respectively; Popi and Popj express the respective populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK, is the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL are dummy variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and when they had a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. means it is the variable in year t-2 (second lag). 
APPENDIX 3
